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Case No. 920522-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992), and Utah R. Crim. 
P. 26(2)(a), whereby a defendant in a district court criminal action 
may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final judgment and 
conviction for any crime other than a first degree or capital felony, 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and 
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief or 
in Addendum A: 
Utah Const, art. I, § 14 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-22 
Utah R. Crim. P. 12 
Utah R. Crim. P. 15 
U.S. Const. amend.IV 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(23) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES* AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the police officers exceed the permissible scope of 
the stop by searching a car without a warrant and without proving 
that a driver, who predominantly spoke Spanish, had knowingly and 
intelligently understood and waived his "Miranda" rights,2 read to 
him by an officer with a limited grasp of the foreign language? 
"[T]he state must demonstrate that the consent was voluntary." State 
v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 
431, 437 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). "In considering the 
trial court's action in denying defendant's motion to suppress, we 
will not disturb its factual evaluation unless its findings are 
clearly erroneous. However, in assessing the trial court's legal 
conclusions based on its factual findings, we afford it no deference 
but apply a 'correction of error standard.'" State v. Palmer. 802 
P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1990). 
2. Did the court err in not suppressing the illegal 
"fruits" of the improper police conduct? "A trial court's legal 
conclusions are accorded no particular deference." Grayson Roper 
Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989). 
1 The issues were raised pursuant to "the Utah Constitution 
as opposed to the Federal Constitution[.]" (R 91). Utah Const, 
art. I, § 14. Any references to federal law or other state court 
opinions are for guiding this Court in its independent 
determination, and not as authoritative weight. See Michigan v. 
Long. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann, § 58-37-8(2)(a) (Supp. 1992). 
On June 5, 1992, Defendant/Appellant Abel Torres moved "to suppress 
evidence illegally seized" by the arresting officers on February 1, 
1992. (R 49-50). Following the suppression hearing, held on 
June 10, 1992, the court entered preliminary findings of fact. 
(R 163-70); see infra Point I. The parties also submitted written 
memoranda for the court's consideration. (R 51-71). 
By stipulation, the parties agreed that in the event the 
court denied the motion the evidence heard during the motion to 
suppress proceeding could be viewed as evidence for a bench 
"trial." (R 52). The court denied Mr. Torres' motion. (R 71). 
On July 31, 1992, the court sentenced Mr. Torres to an 
indeterminate term of one-to-fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison. Mr. Torres was placed on informal probation to the court 
and held in jail pending his release to the I.N.S. (R 73).3 Other 
relevant statements are stated elsewhere in the brief. See infra 
"Statement of Facts"; Point I. 
3 Although the record is unclear, Mr. Torres may have 
been deported. His appeal, however, is not mooted. "Far from 
mooting his appeal, [a defendant's] deportation makes the appeal all 
the more significant. As a result of his Yakima conviction 
[possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), the defendant] will 
be unable to return to this country." State v. Ortiz, 774 P.2d 1229 
(Wash. 1989) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(23): alien convicted of 
narcotics offense "shall be excluded from admission into the United 
States")). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The factual findings initially stated by the trial court 
are reflected by the following exchange: 
THE COURT: . . . I am willing to make some 
findings on the record, if you would like. 
[Counsel for Mr. Torres]: That would help. 
THE COURT: I suppose Officer [Cory] Lyman stated 
it as well as I could, and that is that the facts 
substantially are as indicated, that there was a 
contact between officer Ekker and a confidential 
informant [in Southern Utah]. That that confidential 
informant contacted two individuals [Larry and Gina 
Thatcher] who agreed to purchase for him a quantity of 
cocaine for nine hundred dollars, I think the amount 
was. And that based upon that contact that 
Officer Ekker followed him as he indicated in his 
testimony and listened to a conversation between them 
[the wired confidential informant and the Thatchers] 
that would lead him to reasonably believe that a sale 
of cocaine was going to go down in Salt Lake City. 
That he followed them in that vehicle to Salt Lake 
City and he in turn made contact with the 
Metropolitan— 
[Counsel for the State]: Metro-Narcotics. 
THE COURT: Metro-Narcotics people and asked for 
assistance. That there were Utah County officers who 
joined that procession into Salt Lake, as well. As I 
counted, there were seven cars and I will find that 
there were seven cars and seven police officers at 
least followed the confidential informant and the two 
suspects [Thatchers] to Salt Lake to a location on the 
west side of Salt Lake on Fourth South and about 
Seventh West; listened again to the conversation 
indicating that the person whom he was going to make 
contact, supply the narcotics was not then available, 
took them back to McDonald's Drive-in or Store and 
that he and the lady went in and remained while the 
other suspect took the vehicle that they had driven 
there and left. That Officer Lyman was in contact 
with Mr. Ekker and others who were pursuing his 
vehicle. And that he in turn engaged in a stop of 
that vehicle based upon the information that he had 
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from Officer Ekker and from the observations that he 
made. 
Now, I will also find that at the time of the stop 
the defendant [Mr. Abel Torres] was driving the 
vehicle together with a female identified as his wife 
and that Officer Lyman attempted to state the Miranda 
warning in both English — I don't think he even tried 
in English but in Spanish. I am not convinced that 
the defendant understood what was going on and I am 
not sure that he understood and perceived his rights 
to counsel before making a statement. I do have some 
doubt about his consent to search the car and his 
home. I am almost willing to rule however that there 
was a reasonable articulable suspicion that there were 
narcotics and drugs, that he was part of the drug 
transaction and that the search of the car was 
reasonable under those circumstances. But if you want 
to brief it, that's fine. 
[Counsel for Mr. Torres]: I think two things with 
regard to your findings, I would ask the court to 
consider including in those verbal findings two 
things, that once Detective Lyman began the 
observation of the car, that the — he lost sight of 
the car for a period of approximately fifteen minutes 
and re-encountered the car by positioning himself in 
what he thought to be a logical return route. 
THE COURT: I will make that a finding. 
[Counsel for Mr. Torres]: The additional fact I 
think that has been proved is that when the stop was 
made that the individuals in the car did not match the 
description of the people who were believed to have — 
or supposed to be in the car. 
THE COURT: I agree. I will make that finding. I 
think the issue is whether or not it is reasonable and 
there is a reasonable inference that the defendant was 
a part of this entire transaction because of the 
events and circumstances that had occurred before the 
stop. 
[Counsel for Mr. Torres]: I am assuming from what 
the court said you are prepared to rule today that 
there was reasonable articulable suspicion to stop. I 
have heard the court indicate some concern over the 
subsequent waiver and consent. Is that an issue that 
you are still — 
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THE COURT: I don't think you need address that. 
I think I am willing to—am ready to concede there was 
probably no proper waiver and consent for the search 
of the house at least. But I am not sure that you 
need a waiver and consent to search the car and the 
circumstances of that search. Are you arguing that 
they — that the consent was necessary to search the 
car? 
[Counsel for Mr. Torres]: Yes. 
THE COURT: [Counsel for the State], do you 
believe that to be the fact? 
[Counsel for the State]: No. I am concerned a 
little about the consent. I have seen enough people 
who speak foreign languages come to court and play 
games as far as their knowledge. 
THE COURT: I agree that can be done very easily. 
[Counsel for the State]: It is my opinion that 
that's being done today, based on the officer's 
testimony. 
THE COURT: Let me reserve a ruling on that 
issue. If you want to — 
[Counsel for the State]: I don't know how I am 
going to prove that. I can't obviously believe that— 
THE COURT: You put on everything you have got. 
Let me indicate that I will probably want to 
reconsider and think about that issue. 
[Counsel for the State]: I think the officer 
testified that there was some conversations both in 
English and Spanish, I think it is also clear that 
under our United States Supreme Court case law that 
Miranda warnings and the individual words inside the 
Miranda don't need to be explained and defined other 
than do you understand each of the rights explained to 
you. If the answer is yes, the officer is allowed to 
proceed. 
THE COURT: Let me say I am a little more 
concerned about the issue of the waiver and consent 
than I am of the issue of reasonable suspicion. 
[Counsel for Mr. Torres]: I would ask the court 
to find that the officer admitted to deceiving the 
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defendant prior to the first consent to search. 
THE COURT: I will find that he expressed some 
facts that were not factually true. 
[Counsel for the State]: The deception is though 
we have been watching you, we know you are dealing 
drugs and the defendant goes, you got me. I guess 
that's an exception, but it is not the kind of thing 
that would be unexpected of a narcotics dealer. If 
they don't lie or say we have got a warrant or, you 
know, he said, "We have been watching you. We know 
you have got drugs." He said, "Yeah, you are right." 
I don't see that that is necessarily a deception. I 
am concerned about the defendant's standing to say you 
can't search the seat of this car. It is not even his 
car. Officers only see him driving it and with some 
suspicion that this car is being used to go pick up 
some cocaine. That's the reasonable suspicion that 
suspicion is exactly confirmed. The only difference 
is — 
THE COURT: He is in possession of the car and 
obviously with the consent of the owner. 
[Counsel for the State]: That's not true — the 
owner is over there at McDonald's. 
THE COURT: At least he is in possession of the 
car with the consent of the person who has the right 
to have — I assume the young lady who's registered 
owner of the car is you know — what you want me to 
believe is this—she said, "Take my car and go down 
and get this stuff." 
[Counsel for the State]: I can supply cases to 
the court if you need to the effect that an onerable 
situation, even Utah, the officer is allowed to search 
the area in the immediate vicinity of the driver, 
passenger of the car. That is for primarily the 
driver's safety. The officer will testify that coke 
was found under the seat. 
THE COURT: If the officer has a reasonable 
articulable suspicion under the cases I am familiar 
with he has the right to do a search of the car, 
doesn't he? 
[Counsel for the State]: Right. 
THE COURT: With or without consent. 
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[Counsel for Mr. Torres]: That goes to the Terry 
issue and whether the scope exceeds what he is 
intending to do. Certainly, that goes to the house. 
You can't forget that the officer said that he 
believed that the so-called consent was in part based 
upon the deception that the officer had made to him, 
so if we should brief that issue, Your Honor, when 
would you want us to do that? 
THE COURT: Ten days. 
See (R 163-69) (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Proceedings, dated 
June 10, 1992) (attached as Addendum B). 
Each party then submitted written memoranda to the trial 
court. (R 52-70). The court, however, simply denied the 
suppression motion in a minute entry. (R 71). No findings or 
conclusions on consent were rendered by the court. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
While the existence of "reasonable suspicion" and "consent" 
were both in dispute, the trial court's preliminary findings and its 
summary ruling suggests that its disposition of the first issue 
eliminated any need for it to rule on the second issue. Even if 
reasonable suspicion existed, however, the court still should have 
reached the issue of consent. Its failure to do so requires the 
case to be vacated and remanded. 
Alternatively, the State failed to meet its burden of 
showing that Mr. Torres knowingly and intelligently consented to the 
officer's search of the car. Mr. Torres, an individual who 
predominately spoke Spanish, did not understand the Miranda rights 
inadequately communicated to him by the investigating officer. The 




REVERSAL IS REQUIRED BECAUSE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FAILURE TO ENTER ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACTS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
In State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), the Utah 
Supreme Court vacated the defendant's conviction and remanded the 
case for retrial on the following grounds: 
in ruling on Ramirez's pretrial motion to suppress, 
the trial judge failed to make adequate findings and 
that absent the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law required by rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, it is impossible for us to 
determine the lawfulness of the stop and seizure. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c). 
817 P.2d at 776. The holding in Ramirez governs the present appeal. 
Id.; see also Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987).4 
In Ramirez, the defendant moved to suppress evidence based 
on, inter alia, an unlawful identification procedure and an illegal 
search and seizure: 
[Prior to trial, Ramirez] moved to suppress all 
evidence seized from him, on [the] grounds that the 
seizure violated his rights under the federal and 
state constitutions. The trial court denied the 
motion to suppress the identification, but took under 
advisement the motion to suppress based on unlawful 
4 Another case consistent with the holding in Ramirez is 
Acton v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996 (Utah 1987). See id. at 999 (retrial 
appropriate in light of the inadequate court findings and 
conclusions, and because the trial judge had retired). The trial 
judge here, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, has also retired. 
- 9 -
stop and seizure. The trial judge never explicitly 
ruled on this pretrial motion. 
As noted, the record before us does not include an 
explicit ruling on the lawfulness of the stop and 
seizure. The trial court's minute entry denying the 
motion for a new trial reaffirms the court's earlier 
ruling refusing to suppress the evidence. The earlier 
ruling, however, does not state clearly whether the 
refusal to suppress is based only on a determination 
that the identification procedure was lawful or also 
on an unrecorded ruling on the lawfulness of the stop 
and seizure. 
817 P.2d at 777-78. 
As in Ramirez, the trial court here "took under advisement 
the motion to suppress based on [consent]." See (R 166-67) (after 
the June 10, 1992 suppression hearing, the court stated, "Let me 
reserve a ruling on that issue [consent] . . . I will probably want 
to reconsider and think about that issue [consent]). Following 
these comments and other statements favorable to Mr. Torres on the 
lack of lawfully obtained consent, see generally Point II, the 
court's July 21, 1992 minute entry then stated nothing in a formal 
manner on either the "reasonable suspicion" issue or the "lack of 
consent" issue. (R 71). The minute entry just summarily denied the 
motion to suppress. 
The court's denial is inconsistent with its statements 
pertaining to consent: 
Officer Lyman attempted to state the Miranda warning 
in both English — I [the court] don't think he even 
tried in English but in Spanish. I am not convinced 
that the defendant understood what was going on and I 
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am not sure that he understood and perceived his 
rights to counsel before making a statement. I do 
have some doubt about his consent to search the car 
and his home. 
(R 164-65); see also (R 167) ("Let me say I [the court] am a little 
more concerned about the issue of the waiver and consent than I am 
of the issue of reasonable suspicion"). 
Like the search and seizure issue in Ramirez. the issues in 
the instant action, particularly the inadequacy of consent, cannot 
be deemed to have been implicitly supported by the courts denial of 
the suppression motion. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 
(Utah 1991). The court's own expressed statements make such an 
implicit ruling unreasonable. A retrial is necessary. Id. at 788 
("If the ambiguity of the facts makes this assumption unreasonable, 
however, we remand for a new trial"); see also id. at 787-88 n.6. 
At best, the court informally expressed a lack of concern 
with the "reasonable suspicion" issue. (R 167); (R 165) ("I [the 
court] am almost willing to rule however that there was a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that there were narcotics and drugs, that he 
was part of the drug transaction and that the search of the car was 
reasonable under those circumstances"). Even assuming, arguendo, 
that reasonable suspicion did exist, see infra note 6, reversal 
still is required because the court did not conclude that Mr. Torres 
consented to the search nor could it have held that consent was 
knowingly and intelligently obtained. See infra Point II; compare 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 786-89 (taking "under advisement" a suppression 
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issue and failing to explicitly rule on it was reversible error even 
though another issue [i.e. identification] was properly discounted), 
with (R 166-67) ("Let me [the court] reserve a ruling on that issue 
[consent] . . . I will probably want to reconsider and think about 
that issue [consent]). 
Although the trial court had intended to guide the parties 
with its statements, its preliminary factual findings and legal 
conclusions were inadequate for "meaningful review [of] the issues 
on appeal." 817 P.2d at 788 (quoting State v. Lovecrren. 798 P.2d 
767f 770 (Utah App. 1990)). The minute entry denying Mr. Torres' 
motion to suppress was not enough. (R 71). His conviction should 
be vacated with an order remanding the case for a new trial. See 
Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 776, 789 ("To ask the trial court to address 
the admissibility question now would be to tempt it to reach a post 
hoc rationalization for the admission of this pivotal evidence"); 
Acton v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). 
POINT II 
THE OFFICERS EXCEEDED THE PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF THE 
INTERFERENCE 
In the alternative and assuming the stop of the "charcoal 
gray" Oldsmobile was not improper,5 the officers subsequent actions 
exceeded the permissible scope of the investigative intrusion. The 
5 Appellant acknowledges that under the federal 
constitution, U.S. Const, amend. IV, the officers possessed 
"reasonable suspicion" for the stop. Appellant does not address 
(nor concede) the initial stop pursuant to a state constitutional 
analysis. 
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occupants of the stopped car, Abel Torres and his wife, were 
admittedly "in no way similar" to the persons suspected of being 
involved in the drug transaction. (R 144, 165). The investigating 
officers had no knowledge of a female passenger and the individual 
driving the car, Mr. Torres, did not match the description of the 
targeted suspect. (R 143-44). Sergeant Cory Lyman, an officer 
involved in the investigation once the targeted Oldsmobile drove 
into Salt Lake County, testified, "I was wrong about the 
occupants." (R 146, 165). 
Lyman, who "didn't really participate in the surveillance" 
and who "couldn't see" the Oldsmobile leave McDonald's, (R 127, 
130), "monitor[ed] the [police] radio" to ascertain where the car 
was going. (R 13 0-31). Other officers reported that the car went 
to "960 West on 400 South[,]" the alley way where the car had been 
before. (R 131). The driver, Larry Thatcher, then exited the car. 
(R 131). Even though Lyman believed there were "five [police] cars 
involved in this surveillance[,]" none of the officers reported 
seeing anyone return to the car. (R 131). Two people, however, 
were later seen in the Oldsmobile as it left the alley. (R 131). 
As the officers attempted to follow the car, they lost 
track of it for approximately fifteen-to-twenty minutes. (R 144). 
The police "figured the suspect was watching their vehicle and 
suspected that [the officers] were following them . . . " (R 132). 
The officers "pulled off in order to relieve the suspicion." 
(R 132). 
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Thinking that the car would return to the alley, the 
officers waited at a nearby location. (R 132). When the car 
approached, a marked police car "pulled in behind them . . . [and 
turned on] the emergency equipment. The driver pulled over 
immediately." (R 134). After the uniformed officers told the 
driver and the passenger to get out of the car, "the driver was — 
was a different person than I [Sergeant Lyman] had anticipated. I 
was expecting the male suspect [Larry Thatcher] to get out." 
(R 135). Lyman ordered the stop because the car was the same as the 
identified vehicle. (R 134). 
The occupants, however, were different than expected. The 
driver was Abel Torres and the passenger was his wife. (R 135). 
Nevertheless, the officers confronted Mr. Torres and proceeded to 
question him. (R 135). The issues now in dispute are whether the 
State proved that Mr. Torres had validly waived his constitutional 
rights and whether the two ensuing searches were illegal. 
At the outset, the trial court did not hold that "probable 
cause" existed. Hence, even if the officers possessed "reasonable 
suspicion," the officers7 search of the car would have exceeded the 
scope of the "level two" investigative detention. See Florida v. 
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499 (1983) ("In the name of investigating a 
person who is no more than suspected of criminal activity, the 
police may not carry out a full search of the person or of his 
automobile or other effects")); cf. State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 
(Utah 1990); State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506 (Utah App. 1990). The 
court's "ruling" to the contrary was in error. See (R 165) 
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(emphasis added) ("I [the court] am almost willing to rule however 
that there was a reasonable articulable suspicion that there were 
narcotics and drugs, that he was part of the drug transaction and 
that the search of the car was reasonable under those 
circumstances").6 See also Point I. 
The parties here do not dispute that the officers had no 
warrant; they differ only on the unlawfulness of the procured 
consent, "Searches conducted 'outside the judicial process, without 
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established 
and well-delineated exceptions./H State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684, 
687 (Utah 1990) (quoting Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347, 357 
(1967)). "[W]here the validity of the search rests on consent, the 
State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was 
obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that 
is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful 
authority." Royer, 460 U.S. at 497; accord Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687. 
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that 
the consent was "unequivocal and specific" and "freely 
and intelligently given"; (2) the government must 
prove consent was given without duress or coercion, 
express or implied; and (3) the courts indulge every 
reasonable presumption against the waiver of 
6 As suggested by the following statement, the trial 
court probably viewed "consent" as an nonissue because of its 
"holding" that reasonable suspicion existed. (R 168) ("If the 
officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion under the cases I 
[the court] am familiar with he has the right to do a search of the 
car [with or without consent], doesn't he?). 
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fundamental constitutional rights and there must be 
convincing evidence that such rights were waived. 
United States v. Abbott. 546 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1977), quoted 
in State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 467 (Utah App. 1991); accord State 
v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880, 887-88 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 
1105 (Utah 1990). The State failed to meet its burden in the case 
at bar. It simply did not establish that, one, the officer properly 
communicated the "Miranda" rights to Mr. Abel Torres, and, two, that 
Abel knowingly and intelligently waived those rights before he 
"consented" to the officer's search of the car. 
The actions (or inactions) of Sergeant Lyman reflected his 
own uncertainty about his ability to communicate properly with 
Mr. Torres. Before Sergeant Lyman attempted to converse with Torres: 
there [were] a few minutes [in] between, because I 
[Sergeant Lyman] went and talked to Mike Blackhurst. 
He is a sergeant with Utah County Task Force. I asked 
if they had anyone—if the officers had contacted. 
They indicated he [Mr. Torres] spoke only Spanish. I 
asked if they had any officers that could converse 
with him in Spanish. They didn't have anyone who 
spoke any Spanish. I speak a little bit of Spanish. 
So I talked to him [Torres] and assumed the role 
thereof, being the one to talk to him. 
(R 135-36). 
The trial court was not swayed by Lyman's references to his 
long since past "[j]unior high through high school" Spanish 
classes. (R 149). Sergeant Lyman is 35 years old. He has had no 
formal training in the foreign language. (R 149). Lyman claimed to 
be able to read, write, and "converse" in Spanish, yet he admitted 
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that he did "not consider [him]self capable of doing what this 
gentleman [the Spanish interpreter was] doing and translate." 
(R 153). 
The trial court determines if an interpreter is necessary, 
see Utah R. Crim. P. 15; otherwise, all "[j]udicial proceedings 
shall be conducted in the English language." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-7-22. The presence of a Spanish interpreter during the lower 
court proceedings reflected both the trial court's belief that an 
interpreter was needed to properly apprise Torres of his rights and 
the admitted shortcomings of Lyman's "assumption] [of] the role" of 
interpreter. Landereous v. State. 480 P.2d 273 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1971). As explained by the trial court: 
Officer Lyman attempted to state the Miranda warning 
in both English — I [the court] don't think he even 
tried in English but in Spanish. I am not convinced 
that the defendant understood what was going on and I 
am not sure that he understood and perceived his 
rights to counsel before making a statement. I do 
have some doubt about his consent to search the car 
and his home. 
(R 164-65). Sergeant Lyman failed to properly communicated the 
"Miranda" rights to Mr. Torres. See Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 684 ("case 
law holds that a consent which is not voluntarily given is invalid"). 
On a related note, even if the trial court had found that 
Sergeant Lyman's limited grasp of Spanish sufficed for the reading 
of Miranda rights—a finding the court was unwilling to make—the 
sergeant's deceptive approach further invalidated the consent. The 
court found that the sergeant "expressed some facts that were not 
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factually true." (R 167). Lyman deceived Torres by telling him 
that the officers had been watching him when they really had not. 
(R 155). Sergeant Lyman's own testimony follows: 
Q [Counsel for Mr. Torres:] You [Lyman] deceived him 
[Abel Torres]? 
A [Sergeant Lyman:] Yes, I did. 
Q And you deceived him prior to getting his consent 
to search the car; isn't that right? 
A Yes, to some extent, I let him think I knew more 
than I knew. That was my intention. 
Q You don't think his consent would have been 
affected by your having lied to him? 
A It was probably going to be affected by it. That's 
why I mean — it is an interviewing technique, trying 
to find out information. 
Q Lying is an interviewing technique? 
A Sometimes I prefer to call it subterfuge or 
something like that. 
Q So his subsequent consent to have you search his 
car then his house is based upon lies that you told 
him which you admit might have affected his consent; 
isn't that right? 
A I admit it probably would have affected his 
perception of what was happening. 
(R 155). 
Mr. Torres, who had not understood the rights read to him, 
(R 160, 164), was then improperly deceived into waiving his rights. 
He is a man with a second grade level of education who had never 
encountered such problems before. (R 159, 162); cf. Clewis v. 
Texas. 386 U.S. 707 (1967) (factors of weight in an involuntary 
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determination was the defendant's fifth grade education and the fact 
that he "had apparently never been in trouble with the law before"); 
see State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah App. 1990) (citation 
omitted) ("In examining all the surrounding circumstances to 
determine if in fact the consent to search was coerced, a court must 
take into account both the details of police conduct and the 
characteristics of the accused, which include 'subtly coercive 
police questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective 
state of the person who consents'"). 
Sergeant Lyman also failed to inform Torres that he had a 
right to refuse the officers' search into his car or house. (R 160). 
Although "the government need not establish such knowledge as the 
sine qua non of an effective consent[,] Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 
412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973), quoted in State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 
437 (Utah App. 1990), this Court has noted that such a factor may be 
reflective of invalidly obtained consent: when defendant [Robinson] 
was "asked [by officers] to consent to a search of the vehicle[,] 
[t]here [was] no evidence that Robinson was aware or was informed 
that he did not have to accede to the trooper's request." Robinson. 
797 P.2d at 438; see also State v. Hewitt. 200 Utah Adv. Rep. 53 n.l 
(Utah App. 1992) (in Appellant Hewitt's briefs, incorporated herein 
by reference, Hewitt argued that the state constitution requires 
consent for a search to be knowing as well as voluntary). 
Mr. Torres' consent was neither voluntarily, nor knowingly. It was 
improperly and deceptively procured. The federal principles of 
Robinson apply here with at least equal, if not greater force to 
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Appellant Torres' state constitutional argument. Cf. State v. 
Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) (more protective state 
constitutional interpretation of the automobile exception to the 
warrant requirement); State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991); 
State v. Thompson. 760 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Idaho 1988) (citation 
omitted) ("Long gone are the days when state courts will blindly 
apply United States Supreme Court interpretation and methodology 
when in the process of interpreting their own constitutions"). 
Again, Appellant Torres notes that the above-stated 
"findings" and "conclusions" on consent were ultimately taken under 
advisement or "reserve[d]" for "reconsider[ation]." (R 166-67). 
The trial court's failure to finalize and formalize its ruling 
constitutes grounds for reversal, see Point I, and in light of its 
statements, the court's (minute entry) denial of the suppression 
motion cannot implicitly support a favorable ruling on consent. Cf. 
Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 787-88 n.6. More likely, the court mistakenly 
viewed the existence of reasonable suspicion as determinative of the 
matter. See supra note 6. 
In any case, at the close of the suppression hearing (which 
was the evidentiary equivalent of testimony to be presented at 
trial, [R 52]), the State itself expressed doubt as to whether 
consent was or could have been established: 
THE COURT: . . . Are you [Counsel for Mr. Torres] 
arguing that they — that the consent was necessary to 
search the car? 
[Counsel for Mr. Torres]; Yes 
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THE COURT: [Counsel for the State], do you believe 
that to be the fact? 
[Counsel for the State]: No. I am concerned a little 
about the consent. I have seen enough people who 
speak foreign languages come to court and play games 
as far as their knowledge. 
THE COURT: I agree that can be done very easily. 
[Counsel for the State]: It is my opinion that that's 
being done today, based on the officer's testimony. 
THE COURT: Let me reserve a ruling on that issue. If 
you want to — 
[Counsel for the State]: I don't know how I am going 
to prove that. I can't obviously believe that — 
THE COURT: You put on everything you have got. Let 
me indicate that I will probably want to reconsider 
and think about that issue. 
(R 166-67) (emphasis added). The State did not carry its burden of 
proving that consent was knowingly and voluntarily obtained. 
(R 164) ("I [the court] do have some doubt about his consent to 
search the car and his home"); see State v. Sampson. 808 P.2d 1100, 
1108 (Utah App. 1990) ("the state has a heavy burden to establish 
both that a defendant understood his Miranda rights and that he 
voluntarily waived them""), on petition for reh'g, (Utah App. 1991), 
cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), cert, denied, U.S. , 
112 S.Ct. 1282, 117 L.Ed.2d 507 (1992); State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 
460, 467 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 
883, 885 (10th Cir. 1977) ("the courts indulge every reasonable 
presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights 
and there must be convincing evidence that such rights were 
waived")); State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991) ("in 
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considering the lawfulness of the stop and the seizure and the 
search, the trial court should regard with caution any claim that 
the suspect "consented."). 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUPPRESSING THE ILLEGALLY 
OBTAINED EVIDENCE 
"[Information gained by law enforcement officers during an 
illegal search cannot be used in a derivative manner to obtain other 
evidence . . . " United States v. Hearn, 496 F.2d 236, 243-44 (7th 
Cir.), cert, denied. 419 U.S. 1048 (1974), quoted in State v. 
Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684, 691 (Utah 1990). Mr. Torres7 "consent," 
improperly obtained, cannot be used to justify the officer's search 
of the car. Evidence from the car should have been suppressed. 
(R 137). The search of the house, which occurred "consensually" and 
immediately after the officer's seizure of the substances found in 
the car, were also unlawfully obtained for reasons similar to those 
already discussed. See Point II; Wong Sun v. United States. 371 
U.S. 471 (1963); State v. Sampson. 808 P.2d 1100, 1113 (Utah App. 
1990) ("the trial court must exclude all primary evidence elicited 
during the custodial interrogation and all incriminating evidence 
derived therefrom which is not saved by an exception to the 
exclusionary rule"), on petition for reh'g, (Utah App. 1991), cert. 
denied. 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), cert, denied. U.S. , 112 
S.Ct. 1282, 117 L.Ed.2d 507 (1992); State v. Carter. 812 P.2d 460 
(Utah App. 1991) (prior police illegality was not sufficiently 
attenuated from the taint). 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
trial court's denial of his motion to suppress and remand for a new 
trial. 
SUBMITTED this O day of January, 1993. 
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ADDENDUM A 
58-37-8- Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsec-
tion; 
78-7-22. English language for proceedings. 
Judicial proceedings shall be conducted in the English language. 
Amendment IV of the Constitution of the United States provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized* 
Article I, § 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec* 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance 
of warrant*] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 12. Motions. 
(a) An application to the court for an order shall be by motion. A motion 
other than one made during a trial or hearing shall be in writing unless the 
court otherwise permits. It shall state with particularity the grounds upon 
which it is made and shall set forth the relief sought. It may be supported by 
affidavit or by evidence. 
(b) Any defense, objection or request, including request for rulings on the 
admissibility of evidence, which is capable of determination without the trial 
of the general issue may be raised prior to trial by written motion. The follow-
ing shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial: 
(1) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or infor-
mation other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to 
charge an offense, which objection shall be noticed by the court at any 
time during the pendency of the proceeding; 
(2) motions concerning the admissibility of evidence; 
(3) requests for discovery where allowed; 
(4) requests for severance of charges or defendants under Rule 9; or 
(5) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy. 
(c) A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the 
court for good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later determination. 
Where factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall 
state its findings on the record. 
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to 
make requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the 
court shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant 
relief from such waiver. 
(e) Except injustices' courts, a verbatim record shall be made of all proceed-
ings at the hearing on motions, including such findings of fact and conclusions 
of law as are made orally. 
(f) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the institution of the 
prosecution or in the indictment or information, it may also order that bail be 
continued for a reasonable and specified time pending the filing of a new 
indictment or information. Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect 
provisions of law relating to a statute of limitations. 
Rule 15. Expert witnesses and interpreters. 
(a) The court may appoint any expert witness agreed upon by the parties or 
of its own selection. An expert so appointed shall be informed of his duties by 
the court in writing, a copy of which shall be filed. An expert so appointed 
shall advise the court and the parties of his findings and may thereafter be 
called to testify by the court or by any party. He shall be subject to cross-
examination by each party. The court shall determine the reasonable compen-
sation of the expert and direct payment thereof. The parties may call expert 
witnesses of their own at their own expense. Upon showing that a defendant is 
financially unable to pay the fees of an expert whose services are necessary for 
adequate defense, the witness fee shall be paid as if he were called on behalf of 
the prosecution. 
(b) The court may appoint an interpreter of its own selection and shall 
determine reasonable compensation and direct payment thereof. The court 
may allow counsel to question the interpreter before he is sworn to discharge 
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MR. SKORDAS: No, Your Honor. 
MS. WELLS: Unless the court feels that it has 
sufficient information about the case and the law that 
governs it, and we are prepared to rule now, I am prepared 
to ask that it be briefed. 
THE COURT: No problem. Do you want to brief it? 
That's fine. I am willing to make some findings on the 
record, if you would like. 
MS. WELLS: That would help. 
THE COURT: I suppose Officer Lyman stated it as 
well as I could, and that is that the facts substantially 
are as indicated, that there was a contact between officer 
Ekker and a confidential informant. That that confidential 
informant contacted two individuals who agreed to purchase 
for him a quantity of cocaine for nine hundred dollars, I 
think the amount was. And that based upon that contact 
that Officer Ekker followed him as he indicated in his 
testimony and listened to a conversation between them that 
would lead him to reasonably believe that a sale of cocaine 
was going to go down in Salt Lake City. That he followed 
them in that vehicle to Salt Lake City and he in turn made 
contact with the Metropolitan— 
MR. SKORDAS: Metro-Narcotics. 
THE COURT: Metro-Narcotics people and asked for 



























joined that procession into Salt Lake, as well. As I 
counted, there were seven cars and I will find that there 
were seven cars and seven police officers at least followed 
the confidential informant and the two suspects to Salt 
Lake to a location on the west side of Salt Lake on Fourth 
South and about Seventh West; listened again to the 
conversation indicating that the person whom he was going 
to make contact, supply the narcotics was not then 
available, took them back to McDonald's Drive-in or Store 
and that he and the lady went in and remained while the 
other suspect took the vehicle that they had driven there 
and left. That Officer Lyman was in contact with Mr. Ekker 
and others who were pursuing his vehicle. And that he in 
turn engaged in a stop of that vehicle based upon the 
information that he had from Officer Ekker and from the 
observations that he made. 
Now, I will also find that at the time of the 
stop the defendant was driving the vehicle together with a 
female identified as his wife and that Officer Lyman 
attempted to state the Miranda warning in both English — I 
don't think he even tried in English but in Spanish. I am 
not convinced that the defendant understood what was going 
on and I am not sure that he understood and perceived his 
rights to counsel before making a statement. I do have 
some doubt about his consent to search the car and his 
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home* I am almost willing to rule however that there was a 
reasonable articulable suspicion that there were narcotics 
and drugs, that he was part of the drug transaction and 
that the search of the car was reasonable under those 
circumstances. But if you want to brief it, that's fine. 
MS. WELLS: I think, two things with regard to 
your findings, I would ask the court to consider including 
in those verbal findings two things, that once Detective 
Lyman began the observation of the car, that the — he lost 
sight of the car for a period of approximately fifteen 
minutes and re-encountered the car by positioning himself 
in what he thought to be a logical return route. 
THE COURT: I will make that a finding. 
MS. WELLS: The additional fact I think that has 
been proved is that when the stop was made that the 
individuals in the car did not match the description of the 
people who were believed to have — or supposed to be in 
the car. 
THE COURT: I agree. I will make that finding. 
I think the issue is whether or not it is reasonable and 
there is a reasonable inference that the defendant was a 
part of this entire transaction because of the events and 
circumstances that had occurred before the stop. 
MS. WELLS: I am assuming from what the^court 



























reasonable articulable suspicion to stop. I have heard the 
court indicate some concern over the subsequent waiver and 
consent. Is that an issue that you are still — 
THE COURT: I don't think you need address that. 
I think I am willing to—am ready to concede there was 
probably no proper waiver and consent for the search of the 
house at least. But I am not sure that you need a waiver 
and consent to search the car and the circumstances of that 
search. Are you arguing that they — that the consent was 
necessary to search the car? 
MS. WELLS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mr. Skordas, do you believe that to 
be the fact? 
MR. SKORDAS: No. I am concerned a little about 
the consent. I have seen enough people who speak foreign 
languages come to court and play games as far as their 
knowledge. 
THE COURT: I agree that can be done very easily. 
MR. SKORDAS: It is my opinion that that's being 
done today, based on the officer's testimony. 
THE COURT: Let me reserve a ruling on that 
issue. If you want to — 
MR. SKORDAS: I don't know how I am going to 
prove that. I can't obviously believe that— 
THE COURT: You put on everything you have got. 
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Let me indicate that I will probably want to reconsider and 
think about that issue. 
MR. SKORDAS: I think the officer testified that 
there was some conversations both in English and Spanish. 
I think it is also clear that under our United States 
Supreme Court case law that Miranda warnings and the 
individual words inside the Miranda don't need to be 
explained and defined other than do you understand each of 
the rights explained to you. If the answer is yes, the 
officer is allowed to proceed. 
THE COURT: Let me say I am a little more 
concerned about the issue of the waiver and consent than I 
am of the issue of reasonable suspicion. 
MS. WELLS: I would ask the court to find that 
the officer admitted to deceiving the defendant prior to 
the first consent to search. 
THE COURT: I will find that he expressed some 
facts that were not factually true. 
MR. SKORDAS: The deception is though we have 
been watching you, we know you are dealing drugs and the 
defendant goes, you got me. I guess that's an exception, 
but it is not the kind of thing that would be unexpected of 
a narcotics dealer. If they don't lie or say we have got a 
warrant or, you know, he said, "We have been watching you. 



























right." I don't see that that is necessarily a deception. 
I am concerned about the defendant's standing to say you 
can't search the seat of this car. It is not even his car. 
Officers only see him driving it and with some suspicion 
that this car is being used to go pick up some cocaine. 
That's the reasonable suspicion that suspicion is exactly 
confirmed. The only difference is — 
THE COURT: He is in possession of the car and 
obviously with the consent of the owner. 
MR. SKORDAS: That's not true — the owner is 
over there at McDonald's. 
THE COURT: At least he is in possession of the 
car with the consent of the person who has the right to 
have — I assume the young lady who's registered owner of 
the car is you know — what you want me to believe is 
this—she said, "Take my car and go down and get this 
stuff." 
MR. SKORDAS: I can supply cases to the court if 
you need to the effect that an onerable situation, even 
Utah, the officer is allowed to search the area in the 
immediate vicinity of the driver, passenger of the car. 
That is for primarily the driver's safety. The officer 
will testify that coke was found under the seat. 
THE COURT: If the officer has a reasonable 
articulable suspicion under the cases I am familiar with he 
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has the right to do a search of the car, doesn't he? 
MR. SKORDAS: Right. 
THE COURT: With or without consent. 
MS. WELLS: That goes to the Terry issue and 
whether the scope exceeds what he is intending to do. 
Certainly, that goes to the house. You can't forget that 
the officer said that he believed that the so-called 
consent was in part based upon the deception that the 
officer had made to him, so if we should brief that issue, 
Your Honor, when would you want us to do that? 
THE COURT: Ten days. 
If you don't want to respond, you don't have to. 
MR. SKORDAS: I want to. I will be gone two 
weeks. This is Kent Morgan's case he asked me to try. 
THE COURT: Respond within five days after you 
return. This man will sit in jail all the time? 
MS. WELLS: That's the problem. 
THE COURT: My inclination is it won't make any 
difference. He will be sitting in jail one way or another. 
MS. WELLS: I don't know, but I believe there's 
also an immigration hold. I should have that—we should 
have those in in ten days; is that right? 
THE COURT: I think so. Does that give you 
enough time? 
MR. SKORDAS: We respond ten days after. 
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